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Abstract—Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments increasingly
incorporate long range communication technologies. To support
this transition, wide area IoT deployments are employing LoRa
as their communication technology of choice due to its low
power consumption and long range. The security of LoRa
networks and devices is currently being put to the test in
the wild, and has already become a major challenge. New
features and characteristics of LoRa technology also intorduce
new vulnerabilities against security attacks. In this paper, we
investigate potential security vulnerabilities in LoRa. In partic-
ular, we analyze the LoRa network stack and discuss the possible
susceptibility of LoRa devices to different types of attacks using
commercial-off-the-shelf hardware. Our analysis shows that the
long range transmissions of LoRa are vulnerable to multiple
security attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) applications are widely adopted
in the context of smart cities and industries. Communica-
tion is one of the key requirements for IoT applications.
Contemporary applications in the IoT primarily use short
range communication protocols such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi
or ZigBee. Although GSM technologies offer long range
communication support, it comes at a cost of high resource
overhead. Therefore, long range wireless technologies and
low power wide area networks (LPWAN) were developed
to fill the gap between short range protocols and GSM.
LPWAN technologies minimise deployment complexity, while
offering long coverages in the order of kilometers. LPWAN
technologies such as LoRa and Sigfox are widely used for
applications such as smart metering and factory monitoring.
In such applications, it is important to ensure that the devices
are not vulnerable to security attacks. With the advent of
these technologies, each device has the capability to reach
distances in the order of several kilometers. This significantly
reduces costs by eliminating the need for the deployment of
intermediate routing nodes.
LoRa is a proprietary radio modulation technology licensed
by Semtech Corporation. LoRa provides long-range connec-
tivity by using the chirp spread spectrum technique, and
it operates at 868-900 MHz ISM bands. LoRaWAN MAC
protocol specifies the regulations for LoRa and it defines both
physical and data link standards for LoRa networking.
Telecom operators around the world are deploying LoRa
gateways. Recently in South Korea [1], a nationwide de-
ployment of LoRaWAN has been completed, covering ap-
proximately 99% of the population. Countries such as the
Netherlands and Germany are also actively deploying LoRa
networks. A recent report show that 1.5 million LoRa devices
are currently using the network infrastructure throughout the
Netherlands[1].
The maintenance and security of such networks has started
to become a major hurdle. Securing LoRa end-devices is
also a challenging task due to the limited resources and low-
cost hardware. In order to ensure the dependability of future
deployments of LoRa networks, security measures must be
taken that will allow LoRa networks to cope with different
types of attack. A detailed analysis exposing security threats
for the LoRa technology are important in order to protect
these vast number of devices which have recently started to
effect daily life all over the world.
LoRaWAN [2] guarantees security for LoRa devices
through symmetric-key cryptography. Despite the security fea-
tures of LoRaWAN. LoRa devices are susceptible to security
attacks. For instance, LoRa modulation requires between 900
milliseconds and 1.2 seconds for each LoRa transmission.
This wide transmission window provides ample opportunities
for attackers.
This paper studies the security vulnerabilities of LoRa
and proves that LoRa transmissions are prone to jamming
attacks. In addition, it presents a novel attack by combing
the selective jamming with off-the-shelf hardware. Lastly, this
paper discusses solutions to help the application developers
to overcome such security attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides background information on low power, long
range networking, security measures, and presents related
work. Section III describes detailed security analysis of LoRa
networks. Section IV presents possible weak points and at-
tacks. Section V concludes the analysis and presents possible
attacks against the LoRa technology.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background on the key technology
and main subject of this paper LoRa and LoRaWAN.
The LoRa Alliance technical workgroup defines both phys-
ical and data link standards for LoRa networking [2]. LoRa
provides long-range connectivity by utilising a chirped spread
spectrum technique with a wide bandwidth. Chirp Spread
Spectrum (CSS) was developed for radar applications in the
1940’s [3]. The chirp signal is used to spread the transmitted
signal and it varies in frequency. CSS modulation schemes
are known for low power consumption and robustness against
channel degradation challenges such as interference and
multi-path fading. This modulation scheme offers a range of
data rates for different frequency ranges. In LoRa networks,
the data rate is selected based on the range requirement, and
there is a trade-off between data rate and communication
range. LoRa technology has ability to demodulate several
simultaneous signals at the same frequency by using different
chirp rates due to their orthogonality. LoRa modulation de-
fines six chirp rates which are called spreading factors, trading
throughput for the on-air time. As demonstrated in [3] if a
device needs a longer communication range, it uses higher
spreading factor. At the highest spreading factor , the time
on-air could range between 0.9 to 1.2 seconds, depending on
payload length.
On top of LoRa, it is possible to utilise several different
networking protocols and topologies (star, mesh, etc.) to
support the Internet of Things. LoRaWAN [2] defines the
network-layer architecture for LoRa-enabled systems, while
the physical layer provides long range communication through
LoRa modulation. LoRaWAN is star networking topology
which uses gateway devices for receiving data from nodes
and forwarding it onto LoRaWAN servers. It is specifically
designed for low power networked embedded systems.
The LoRaWAN specification [2] defines the frequency
bands for LoRa communication. In Europe, LoRa operates
in the 433MHz and 868Mhz ISM frequency bands, while in
the USA it operates in the 900MHz band. LoRa frequency
bands are controlled by regulatory authorities. In Europe,
the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI)
imposes strict guidelines for the use of various frequency
bands. According to ETSI regulations, each end-device should
follow a duty cycle between 0.1% and 10% depending on
the operational sub-band in Europe. In USA, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) imposes duty-cycling
differently: each end-device is restricted from using the oper-
ational sub-band for 400 milliseconds after each transmission.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section the LoRa network stack is described and
analyzed.
A. Physical Layer
As was mentioned in the previous section, the LoRa
physical layer uses Chirp Spread Spectrum. This technique
has been commonly used by the military and in secure
communication applications. Recently it has started to be
adopted by some communications applications due to its rela-
tively low power requirements and robustness against channel
degradation challenges such as interference and multi-path
fading.
This modulation scheme offers a range of data rates on
different frequency ranges. In LoRa networks, the data rate is
selected based on range requirements, and there is a trade-off
between data rate and communication range. From Table I,
it is evident that the maximum range increases the energy
consumption of the end-device, while reducing the data rate.
Figure 1 shows the time on air as a function of payload
for each different spreading factors. In LoRaWAN, time on
air defines the elapsed time on air for a LoRaWAN packet
Figure 1: Time on Air of LoRa with code rate 4/5 and a 125
kHz bandwidth.
between end-device and gateway. Time on air for different
configurations for each packet can be calculated using a
formula provided in LoRaWAN specifications [2]. As can
be seen from the Figure 1, low data rates lead to very
long transmission times especially when compared with other
wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4 [4] and WiFi.
In an IEEE 802.15.4 based network over the air time varies
between 10-100 ms depending on the payload size [5]. In
addition in a WiFi network, packet transmission time over
the air is between 0.3 ms & 30 ms [6]. On the other hand,
in a basic LoRa network, a device at the edge of the network
must communicate with a high spreading factor(i.e. SF12),
and can take around 0.9 to 1.5 seconds depending on payload
size.
Longer than usual transmission times may be exploited to
intercept packets on the air or even corrupt packets before they
reach to the gateway. This creates opportunities to perform
novel attacks on the LoRa physical layer.
B. LoRaWAN
LoRaWAN defines the networking protocol for LoRa based
devices. It specifies different device types, different keys, and
encryption capabilities to build a secure wireless network.
According to the LoRaWAN specifications, LoRa end-
devices are classified into three different classes. Class A
devices support bi-directional communication, in which each
end-device has two short down-link receive windows af-
ter an up-link transmission. The end-device schedules the
transmission slot according to its communication needs (on
random time basis i.e. ALOHA-type). Class B end-devices
also support bi-directional communication, but have additional
receive windows, which are determined by time-synchronized
beacons from the gateway. This allows the server to know
when the end-device is listening. Finally, Class C devices
allow continuous reception of data due to its maximal receive
slots. At the time of writing, only Class A end-devices are
available in the market.
LoRaWAN specifies a number of identifiers for devices.
All end-devices have a 64-bit unique identifier called Device
Identifier (DevEUI) which is set by vendors or developers.
In addition, all communication is done using 32 bit de-
vice address. Another identifier, called Application Identifier
(AppEUI), uniquely identifies the application provider of the
end-device.
The cryptographic security is handled using AES-128
operating in CTR mode [7], providing multiple layers of
encryption in LoRaWAN. LoRaWAN uses separate device,
network, and application keys to secure packets at the network
and application level, respectively. This allows intermediate
nodes such as gateways and cloud routers to perform routing
and network maintenance tasks, while preserving the confi-
dentiality of application data.
A 128-bit AES key known as the Application Key (App-
key) is used to generate two session keys which are called
Network Session Key (NwkSKey) and Application Session
Keys (AppSKey). The NwkSkey is shared by both the end-
device and the network server to generate and verify the
message integrity code (MIC). This ensures the integrity of
messages, and creates a specific signature for every device.
The AppSKey is similar to the NwkSkey, but it is used for
encrypting and decrypting the payload of application data.
LoRaWAN creates a key stream using NwkSKey, AppSKey,
and the up-link or down-link counter of the messages. There-
fore, each message is encrypted by using the XOR operation
with the corresponding key from the key stream to generate
the encrypted payload.
The LoRaWAN protocol ensures the security, and provides
encryption capability between the end-device and the gateway.
However, the payload length is always the same before
and after the encryption. This can be used together with
overflowing counters by a malicious entity to restore the key
stream from the encrypted messages.
C. Join Procedures and Packet Structure
LoRaWAN defines two joining procedures for end-devices:
OTAA and ABP. For an end-device to join a LoRaWAN
network, one of the procedures should be followed. Over-the-
Air Activation (OTAA) requires DevEUI, the AppEUI, and an
AppKey. An end-device must follow this procedure every time
it joins a new network or loses the session key information.
OTAA is described as the most secure way to authenticate
since a network session key ,specifically for that end-device, is
generated each time the device joins the network. This allows
roaming between networks of different providers. In addition,
having two keys makes tampering with or reading application
data harder, even if one of the keys are compromised. The
end-device initiates the OTAA procedure by a sending join-
request message. The message includes the AppEUI, DevEUI,
and nonce (DevNonce) of the end device. The DevNonce is
a random value which is tracked by the network server and
used to reject any join request with an invalid nonce value.
This mechanism prevents replay attacks.
The second joining procedure is Activation by Personal-
ization (ABP). This procedure directly connects end-devices
to the specified network without initiating a join-request and
accept procedure. The device address (DevAddr), NwkSKey,
and AppSKey are directly defined and stored in the end-
device. Therefore, it does not generate any keys and can
directly encrypt messages using these keys. If the keys are
compromised, all communication between the device, gate-
way, and network server can be decrypted by third party
entities for the lifetime of the device.
After the join procedure, the end-device starts to send
messages to gateways by following the LoRaWAN protocol.
There are two types of messages: up-link and down-link
message types. Up-link messages are sent by end-devices
passing through gateways to the network server. Up-link
messages must include a preamble, the physical layer header,
header CRC and a physical layer payload and including its
own CRC at the end of the message to protect the integrity of
entire packet. The physical layer payload is formed by MAC
layer headers, frame headers, payload, and message integrity
code. The structure of a LoRa packet is shown in Figure 2.
Vulnerability of ABP: One of the potential vulnerability
is using ABP for joining, but deriving these keys from
publicly available information. This could be worked out
through reverse engineering of one device, then all other
communications to any device would then be compromised.
Therefore, a unique set of NwkSkey and AppSKey must be
derived for each device to protect the communication of other
devices. In addition, LoRaWAN packet structure does not
include any time based data or signature to validate the time of
the message, and this might create a vulnerability to perform
replay or/and wormhole attacks on LoRaWAN networks.
Table I: Data rate supported by LoRaWAN
Data rate Spreading Factor Bandwidth(In kHz) Radio bit rate(Bytes/sec) Range/Energy Consumption
0 SF12 125 31 Longest / Highest
1 SF11 125 55 Longer / Higher
2 SF10 125 122 Long / High
3 SF9 125 220 Short / Small
4 SF8 125 390 Shorter / Smaller
5 SF7 125 683 Shortest / Smallest
Figure 2: LoraWAN Packet Structure.
D. End devices and Gateways
A typical LoRa network consists of four different compo-
nents: devices, gateways, a network server, and application
service. The hardware setup of LoRa networks are similar
to WiFi networks. Devices do not send messages to each
other rather they send messages to LoRa gateways. Gateways
usually have simple tasks. They scan the spectrum and receive
LoRa packets from end-devices and forward their data to a
network service which handles the packets if they are valid.
The network server or service handles decryption of packets
and other LoRaWAN features such as adjusting adaptive data
rates. It then forwards to data to the application.
The end-device must have a LoRa transceiver chip which
is designed and manufactured by the SemTech Corporation.
Right now in the market, all products are based on the
SemTech LoRa transceiver. For development purposes, there
are integrated circuits with SPI communication and recon-
figurable interrupt capabilities such as Semtech SX127x[8]
series or with USB communication and easy installation
capabilities such as MicroChip Rn2483[9]. Both products
are based on Semtech products as explained before, but the
RN2483 module provides a command set to configure and
control the radio module. However, in all products in the
market, firmware has to be developed for the end-device and
as it was mentioned in earlier sections, security keys must be
implemented by the developer in the firmware.
On the other hand, gateways form and important part of
LoRa networks from the security perspective. In the market,
many different gateways can be found with different specifi-
cations for different needs. Most of the gateway architecture is
based on combination of a Semtech Lora Radio Concentrator
and an embedded Linux computer such as Raspberry Pi, Bea-
gle Bone and etc. The Radio concentrator has massive digital
processing power and it is specifically designed to provide
powerful gateway capabilities in the ISM bands. It is usually
used with two LoRa transceivers and can listen and receive
packets from different channels simultaneously. The gateway
usually also runs a network server since it normally contains a
powerful embedded computer. The gateway contains valuable
information about end-devices and manages security keys for
the network.
The gateway in LoRaWAN creates a single failure point
for the network which could be used to disconnect hundreds
of end-device from application. Moreover, physical access by
malicious entities might lead to the security keys and other
data to be compromised.Additionally, since the security keys
are implemented in the firmware of LoRaWAN end-devices,
the development of the firmware is quite important for the
whole LoRa network to protect security keys from falling
into the hands of malicious entities.
IV. VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACKS
We explain the security vulnerabilities and possible attacks
in this section.
A. Compromising Device and Network Keys
LoRaWAN provides end-to-end security using application
and network keys. However, an attacker with physical access
may compromise the LoRa end-devices. If an attacker gains
physical access to a device, he/she may extract the keys.
Usually, end-devices contain a LoRa radio module and a host
microcontroller unit (MCU). The radio module communicates
with the host microcontroller via UART or SPI interface.
Commands and data exchanges between the host and the
radio module can be intercepted using external hardware. For
instance, if UART interface is used between two ICs, a basic
FTDI interface can be used to extract all the key exchanges.
Contemporary radio modules on the market does not provide
built-in encryption support to secure the interactions between
the host microcontroller and radio module. In such cases, there
is no way to understand that the commands sent to the radio
module were issued by the host MCU or a malicious entity.
Also a malicious entity could intercept all the data exchanges
between the host MCU and the radio module and use this
intercepted information to create a mock device with the
same credentials or manipulate the data payload. Therefore,
application developers must not perform sensitive operations
such as setting security keys for each data transmissions as it
may expose critical informations to malicious entities.
To prove the feasibility of this attack, the Xignal mousetrap
[10] was used as a target device. The hardware unit was tam-
pered to expose the UART serial lines between the MCU and
the LoRa radio module. A regular FTDI chip was connected
to the serial line to read intercept all the transactions between
them. We noticed that whenever the mousetrap was reset, the
host MCU issues commands to configure the network keys
of the radio module. Using these keys and our custom LoRa
device, we impersonated a LoRa mouse trap and sent data
as if it were coming from the mouse trap. Following this
attack we informed the Xignal engineers about the security
vulnerability in their devices.
Figure 3: LoRaWAN COTS Jammer Success Rate
B. Jamming Techniques
Radio jamming is one of the serious problems for IoT
deployments [11]. Malicious entities can transmit a pow-
erful radio signal in the proximity of application devices,
and disrupt the radio transmissions. Typically, such attacks
require dedicated hardware, which minimises the possibility
of jamming attacks in real-world devices. However, our ex-
perimentation reveals that it is possible to jam LoRa devices
using commercial-off-the-self LoRa hardware.
CSS modulation is known for its robustness against inter-
ferences, but Brecht et al. [12] showed that LoRa devices
suffer from coexistence issues. [12] shows that concurrent
LoRa transmissions at same frequency and spreading factor
can interfere with each other. This vulnerability in LoRa
physical layer allows malicious entities or third parties to use
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) LoRa devices to jam LoRa
networks.
Most importantly, this attack requires just an Arduino
platform with a LoRa radio module. Anyone with malicious
intent can flood LoRa messages at a certain frequency to
wipe out all the transmissions in that frequency, and our
validation results in Figure 3 shows that roughly 99% of LoRa
transmissions are affected by such a jamming approach. For
this attack, we used an Arduino Leonardo [13] board and a
Semtech LoRa radio module [8] breakout board. The total
cost of such a device is around 30 euro. Therefore, it is easy
to disrupt LoRa transmissions with a cheat COTS hardware
platforms.
Although it is hard to prevent such an attack, there are
workarounds to overcome this issue. Firstly, the jamming of
the whole network or frequency can be easily detected since
all the devices that communicate in that frequency would
suddenly start to drop out from the network. By detecting
such abnormal behaviours, network administrators can take
appropriate action (for instance, by switching the operational
frequency) to prevent the impact of jamming.
LoRa transmission on-air times vary from hundreds of mil-
liseconds to 1.5 seconds, depending on the payload size and
spreading factor. According to Vanhoef et al. [14], wireless
transmissions of specific devices can be selectively selectively
by using their device address. Once a jammer receives the
initial bytes related with the device address, and if device
address matches with the desired device address, a selective
jammer could corrupt the rest of the message before it reaches
the destination. Such an attack is already performed in WiFi
networks [14]. Therefore, selective jamming of LoRa devices
are possible using COTS hardware by extending our jammer
with additional software to target a specific device address.
C. Replay Attacks
A replay attack is an attack on security protocol, re-sending
or repeating the valid data transmission by the malicious
entity. The main purpose of this attack is fooling the device
or module by using handshake messages or old data from the
network. In order to perform the attack in wireless networks,
the entity should know the communication frequencies and
channels to sniff data from transmission between devices.
In LoRaWAN, it is not possible to decrypt transmissions
between end-devices and gateways without AppSKey, since
the entire payload of the LoRaWAN message are encrypted by
it. Additionally, since tampering with the data will make the
MIC check fail, it is not possible to do it without NwkSKey.
Although the malicious entity can resend the message consec-
utively, using frame counters which are defined in LoRaWAN
specifications these messages or attacks can be detected and
discarded. Once the end-device is activated, these counters are
both set to 0 and each message coming from the gateway or
the device increments counters. If a message is received with
a lower frame counter than the last message, it is ignored.
However, the LoRaWAN specification handling off frame
counters is specifically left to the application and developer.
Therefore, networks which do not track these frame counters
could be vulnerable to replay attacks.
In addition, this security measure has consequences for
development devices, which often use ABP activation to join
networks. Each time the end-device is rebooted, it resets its
frame counters to 0. Thus, if a malicious entity is able to
reset the end-device, messages which were obtained before by
sniffing the transmission between the end-device and gateway
could be replayed back to the gateway. As it is described
in [15] the effect of this particular attack depends on the
application, but in the case of a LoRa based burglar alarm,
it might be used to replay an alarm disable message while
the actual end-device, in this case it is an burglar alarm, is
sending alarm messages. On the other hand, networks such
as The Things Network block all the messages coming from
the device until its frame counter reaches the frame counter
stored in the gateway. However in this kind of application,
if the end-device reboots itself because of its routine or to
get rid of technical problems, it will be blocked for a certain
amount of time.
D. Wormhole Attacks
As it was mentioned in earlier sections, characteristics of
LoRa physical layer might be used to perform novel attacks.
Our study shows that, end-devices in LoRaWAN network can
be jammed by using off-the-shelf hardware. Together with
replay attack, a wormhole attack[16] can be performed against
LoRaWAN network. In this type of attack, one malicious
device captures the packets from one device and transmits
them to other distant located device to replay the captured
packet. This can easily be launched by malicious entity
without prior knowledge of the network or cryptographic
mechanism.
In LoRaWAN network, a wormhole attack could be per-
formed by using two type of device that are sniffer and jam-
mer. The sniffer captures packets and, signals to the jammer
to notify that it captured the packet. The captured packet never
reaches to the gateway and, validation of captured message
stays valid. The captured message can be replayed any time.
Gateway and Network server forwards to the packet to the
application layer. Therefore, the important alarm messages
can be jammed and regular messages which are captured
before and never reached to the gateway, could be sent to the
gateway as if there is no alarm. Since there is no time-related
information in LoRaWAN messages, it is hard to detect this
attack in LoRaWAN networks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the LoRa network
stack and introduced possible vulnerabilities. LoRa provides
a far greater coverage than prior wireless sensor network
technologies with low power consumption. Moreover, LoRa
devices and networks are already deployed and widely used
in some countries. That might indicate that LoRa is a very
promising wireless network technology for IoT devices. On
the other hand, providing long range communication, also
cause very long transmission times in the networks that is not
observed before in other wireless sensor network technolo-
gies. In addition, our results indicate that LoRa devices has
coexisting problems with other LoRa networks and devices.
Devices using lower spreading factors can corrupt signal from
devices using higher spreading factor in the same network.
Furthermore, most LoRaWAN security measures such as the
key management and frame counters need to be implemented
and taken care of by developers or manufacturers. Therefore,
poor implementation also may put end-devices and gateways
in danger. To sum up, our analysis and results shows that
long range transmission of LoRa and LoRaWAN has serious
security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious
third entities.
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